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The Social Challenges of Modern State-Building in Afghanistan

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Abstract. Empirical-historical evidences indicated that the process of state-building in the third world and developing countries has not been performed successfully and has faced important crises such as identity crisis, legitimacy, nation-building, and ethnic-religious violence. The present study aimed to identify the important social barriers or challenges or state-building in the current Afghanistan. Based on the hypothesis, ethnic gaps, identity crisis, violence caused by such active and rooted gaps, destructive role-playing of Talibanism and biased sectarianism of this current, cultural poverty, and severe traditional nature of society were considered as the significant challenges or barriers of inclusive state-building in Afghanistan. In this study, the above-mentioned problem was studied in the framework of failed state theory through a sociological-scientific explanation. Historical evidence from the past century ago indicated that ethnic-religious gaps and the resulted identity crisis have worked as important challenges and barriers of inclusive state-building in Afghanistan and the crisis in the last presidential elections can be analyzed in this regard.

Keywords. Afghanistan, state-building, social challenges, failed state

Introduction

Different opinions are available on the origin of modern states which were formed in Europe since the 17th century onward. Some individuals like Charles Tilly, Eto Hintz, Thomas Hartmann, and Michael Mann emphasized the effect of wars and their financing by states on the formation of modern states. Perry Anderson, the theorist of absolute modern state, emphasized the development of modern states on social-economic crises in feudal regimes, reduced financial ability and controlled aristocracy, powered business bourgeoisie, and its need to a centralized and modern state. Charles Tilly believed that no modern state had been ever formed in Europe before the 17th century. The states had a local or pseudo-state form. Since 1750 onward, the governance of states developed for increasing wars and resulted expenditures (Tilly, 2006:67). The formation of state had begun with the beginning of colonialism outside of Western Europe. Adam Watson and Martin White explained the expansion of Westphalian system around the world in details. It should be noted that western powers, especially the US attempted to direct the project of state-building and even democratization in the third world countries during the Cold War and post-Cold War. The US declared the “Big Middle East” plan in the Middle East after September 11, 2001 to create democracy, have social-economic development, and revive the rights of women and minorities, but this plan failed. Afghanistan was turned into an important threat and subject for the global security and was considered in

political and academic meetings around the world after September 11, 2001. The high failure of state turned Afghanistan into the center of terrorism. Although this country has an ancient culture, it is facing with huge challenges in cultural, social, political, and economic dimensions in the nation-state process. The historical experience of Afghanistan is full of authoritarian governance, social-political suppression, and lack of democratic experience and is far from public and national governance. However, some steps such as formulating a constitution, holding presidential elections, parliament elections, political institution, and social-political freedoms of civic institutions and political activists have been taken with the foreign intervention in the process of state-building. Karzai's administration has asked the Taliban to join the state and avoid violence to create political stability and form an inclusive state during the past years. Nevertheless, such steps for creating an inclusive and democratic state were limited and faced serious social-political challenges and barriers. In this regard, a mixture of internal political, social, and economic factors, as well as foreign factors have been effective with the role-playing of regional and trans-regional activists. This study focused on the analysis of the above-mentioned problem from the perspective of social challenges and barriers. The important problem in this study is related to the important barriers of Afghanistan and Karzai's administration in the process of authoritarian state-building.

In this study, the social challenges and barriers, as well as the failure of inclusive state-building in Afghanistan were analyzed using the causal-sociological explanation. Causal-sociological explanation means that no political issue or phenomenon such as state failure has been formed in void in the current Afghanistan and is rooted in an unorganized social context.

In fact, the present study aimed to identify the important social barriers or challenges of state-building in the current Afghanistan. The most critical social barriers of inclusive state-building in the current Afghanistan were active and rooted ethnic gaps, identity crisis, and increasing ethnic violence, destructive role-playing of Talibanism, biased sectarianism, cultural poverty, and severe traditional nature of society.

1. Theoretical and conceptual framework

In this part, the main concepts are first defined. Then, the theoretical framework is raised with a focus on the failed state theory. Social gaps refer to the main conflicts in the society in the ethnic-religious, linguistic, class, and modern areas, as well as modern conflicts which cause different dynamic forms, alignment between social forces, and formation of party organizations or dependent non-modern pseudo-organizations. In failed societies and states, internal war and violence occurs due to unsolved social gaps, lack of civic culture, disbelief of social forces and state to a systematic and democratic competition, lack of an authoritarian state, legitimacy crisis, inefficiency crisis, and unfamiliarity of society with state regularly. State-building is a process by which a political society attempts to gain and promote its autonomy, governance, and independency through accumulating the power and developing its institutional potentials. The aim of such a process is evolving the state as an authoritarian institutional entity and strengthening the nation as an integrated social structure with a unified identity, as well as approaching them as much as possible (Qavam and Zargar, 2008: 221).

In this regard, state-building has some fundamental components such as increasing and developing political potentials (power accumulation, unitary state, and political will governing the society), developing national and functional potentials (Security building, using legitimate force, increasing educational, service, social, economic, and welfare efficiencies of the state), and developing the institutional and bureaucratic potentials (Sardarnia, 2013:27).

Nation-building is used in line with creating and developing a shared identity in form of nation, sustainable national identity, pride, integrity, and national solidarity. The process of nation-

building some significant dimensions including the development of empathy among the nation and state, development of links among ethnic and linguistic groupings, gradual erosion of national commitments and acceptance of civic-national parties, as well as national authority, and development of communications, educational, and other infrastructures in the society to link the other parts of the country to the capita (Sardarnia, 2013:28). Nation-building mainly refers to the process of integrating the people of a country through creating a national unity so that people feel that they are integrated and trust each other (Ahlerup & Hansson, 2011:431). Huntington raised some steps of nation-state building process based on the experiences from European countries as follows.

1. Creating a modern state and developing new and bureaucratic institutions, as well as evolutions in educational, communication, economic, and other areas by the modernist elites.
2. Attempting to build nation and national identity by the state through modern educational, communication, and cultural institutions, as well as national authority beyond the sub-national identities and authorities
3. Increasing the capacity of accountability and efficiency of modern state and new state institutions
4. Creating and developing the participatory potentials of states and institutions for participating different people, groups, and classes in nation-state building (Huntington, 1994: 56-58)

Ashtin Rokan used the center-periphery approach and focused on the history of Europe to mention three historical stages in line with nation-state building including the formation of centralized political structure or state and then creating a national identity and monopoly of legitimate force, influencing and developing the state or center gradually in the periphery through developing the institutions, bureaucracy, and army, as well as attempting seriously to solve the crises of identity, legitimacy, integrity, influence, distribution, and participation by the state and social forces (Badie, 1997: 105-106).

2. Failed states, indicators, and factors

The modern concept of modern state goes back to Max Weber in the late 1920s. Weber considered modern state composed of political, administrative, and security institutions having the exclusive right of legitimate force on certain people in a certain country. Modern states are known with important functions such as establishing discipline and security, legislation, judgment and solving conflicts, integrity and solidarity in different classes of people, authoritarian and fair distribution of products and services in the society far from obvious discriminations, and establishing the rule of law, which are distinguished from authoritarian states by such functions (Edwards, 2010:269-270). For this purpose, modern states must have some regulatory, extracting, symbolic, distributive, and security abilities.

Theorists and academic associations distinguish between the concepts of weak and failed states and collapsed states. Weak and failed states lack the required potential for controlling and influencing the society, regulating social relationships, extracting human, material, and symbolic resources, allocating the resources in an authoritarian way, which cannot establish discipline and apply authority in the society (Heir & Robinson, 2007: 3).

Weak and failed state are not collapsed unlike collapsed states and the state governance is not completely ruined but the state faces authority crisis or a degraded authority (Heir & Robinson, 2007: 6). On the contrary, collapsed states are completely ruined and are an extreme kind of disabled state which is highly degraded where the gap of an inclusive central power causes the collapse of state and multiple governance and the claimants of power among nations and religions enforce illegitimate power and internal war. Somali was an example of such states in

the late 1980s. In the most optimistic way, this type of state should be called pseudo-state (Rotberg, 2009:9;Heir & Robinson, 2007: 5). In such societies, states are practically collapsed and have no control on borders, the linking political, regulatory, and social factors are ruined, and it lacks legitimacy to the majority of people in the society although there is a part of the state structure. No centralized, powerful, inclusive, and legitimate structure is available for public services and establishment of discipline and has no international legitimacy (Yazdanfam, 2011:179). Peace foundation ranks countries and states from 1 to 120 every year based on some indicators called “collapsed states indicators”. The higher the score or rank, the more collapsed the state. Such indicators include population pressures, number and quantity of the homeless, group complaints, elite migration, unequal and unbalanced economic development, economic recession and poverty, weak legitimacy of state, public services, human rights and citizen rights, performance of security institutions, elite convergence or divergence, and foreign interventions (The fund for peace, 2014). Unlike collapsed states, the most important indicators of authoritarian states from the perspective of international institutions such as the United Nations Development Program, Transparency International, and Freedom House include high security level, lack of political violence, legal positivism, judicial justice, guaranteed political and civic freedoms, establishment of an appropriate environment for economic growth, and rule of law (Rotberg, 2009: 4).

Based on one of these definitions, the features of weak and failed states include very weak executive power, low financial and tax revenues, inability in satisfying public needs, weak will of state in enforcing authority, inability in presenting sufficient and timely services to citizens, and loose legitimacy among people and states in the international arena (USAID, 2005:1). Citizens do not consider this state competent due to its inability in fulfilling its tasks and demands and such a state lacks the required legitimacy (Marshal and Goldston,2007:13-14). In the legitimacy of modern state, the democratic and civic dimensions are not focused while the functional-service aspect and state efficiency in welfare and security dimensions, as well as the interaction of state and people are considered. However, such factors are not included in failed states and the lack of legitimacy leads to weakened functional-service potential in the state. Such a consequence leads to the severe weakness of the state (OEC, 2010:7-8).

Weak and failed states weaken their legitimacy and finally lose it due to inability in fulfilling fundamental functions in different areas, especially security and service. In fact, legitimacy cannot be obtained merely through symbolic and advertising functions. The fair and authoritarian distribution of services in different dimensions has a strong link to state legitimacy and its continuity. Among the demands, building security is of higher importance which includes collective, group, individual, mental, spiritual, physical, internal, marginal, occupational, and social dimensions (Rotberg, 2009:2-3). Huntington believed that developing societies require severe organization and institutionalization for preventing the failed state. According to Huntington, the main problem of these countries is not freedom but creating a political organization (Huntington, 1996:16). Huntington considered the authority crisis and lack of institutionalization as the significant features of failed states and believed that the most important indicators of such states in the third world are increasing ethnic-religious violence, failed dictator states, rebellions and internal wars, consecutive coup, political instability, authority crisis, inability of state in enforcing authority and law effectively, and the lack of authoritarian political institutions for realizing the collective benefits and public security (Huntington, 1996:10). The bases of weak and failed states are very fragile. Such states face different crises such as authority crisis, inability to enforce legitimate dominance effectively, efficiency, financial, economic, and legitimacy (Yazdanfam, 2011:27). Other crises include crisis in creating intellectual-cultural solidarity and value consensus in the society, lack of

discipline or lack of creating a rule-based stability with regular dynamism away from violence, a gap in the board of governors and state elites, and a gap among the actors and classes in a diverse society. In general, the presence of the above-mentioned crises in a diverse society indicates that such states encounter systematic crises such as legitimacy, authority, and identity and sub-systematic crises like economic crises, influence, distribution, and integrity. The above-mentioned systematic crises seriously damage the infrastructure and foundation of society, i.e. national identity, society integrity, and state legitimacy leading to a gap in a diverse society, failed state, lack of discipline, and finally the collapse of state.

Failed states cause internal social-political instability and can seriously damage the international stability at the international level. In addition, such states can be a secure shelter for terroristic groups and international terrorism. Thus, these states are not typically identified internationally (Ottaway & Mair, 2004: 6).

In failed states, no social-political discipline is realized purely in its civic-modern and traditional forms, but it is a combination of modern and pre-modern components, as well as modern and pre-modern social gaps (OECD, 2010: 9). Such a combined context causes a variety of conflicts and social-political conflicts, identity confusion, conflict of modern identity, and pre-modern identities. If such a context is not managed by gradual and systematic methods, as well as the cooperation of state and society with an effective social-political will, it will lead to a failed state and the collapse of discipline, political authority, and social solidarity. According to Huntington, the most important factors of the lack of institutionalization, failure, and violence in failed states include the lack of adaptability of the state with evolutions, needs and complexities of society and the surrounding environment, lack of specialized institutions, lack of state independence from social gaps and groupings, inattention to collective benefits, serious weakness of state in enforcing authority, inability of elites in removing the adverse conflicts and consequences caused by the gap between modernity and tradition, severe confrontation in modern and traditional currents, corruption, lack of establishing an effective justice and unequal distribution of advantages of benefits caused by modernization, expansion of distrust, cultural poverty, lack of institutionalized culture and civic beliefs, poverty, severe class gap, and unmet increasing expectations, and inefficiency of failed states (Huntington, 1996: 31-116).

3. Afghanistan political history

Afghanistan had no central state before 1923 but was governed by different tribes as feudalism in a scattered way. In addition, Afghanistan was known as a country with no modern political discipline and law. This country developed a constitution for the first time as the first manifestation of modern state in 1923 during the governance of Habibullah. During the political history of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, the son of Habibullah implemented some reforms and modernization under the influence of Ataturk, the leader of Turkey. In addition, he raised some suggestions for establishing a constitutional monarchy. However, his reforms were mainly in the social-cultural area and banning veils. In the context of a serious gap between tradition and modernity, as well as the rooted current of traditionalism and conservatism, Amanullah Khan's suggestions and actions were opposed by Loya Jirga, and finally he was exiled upon a public uprising. Nader Shah was selected as a king by Loya Jirga in 1930. His constitution was a combination of dictator monarchy and alliance with religious conservatism. In this period, the Hanafi school was recognized as the official religion and the basis of legislation in the country. Finally, he was assassinated by a high school student in 1933. The 40-year rule of Muhammad Zaher Shah during 1933-1973 is of special importance in the history of Afghanistan. The third constitution of this country was developed based on constitutional monarchy in 1964 and the parliament gained the power of legislation. Although Sharia was recognized as a basis for

legislation, the legal system of this country was mainly customary and the constitution declared an independent legal system. Nevertheless, most of the authorities belonged to Zaher Shah. Elections were held in 1965 and the parliament of representatives was established. Zaher Shah issued the order of establishing People's Democratic Party which was composed of two parties of people and flag from Pashto rural right-wing parties and urban left-wing parties (Edwards, 2010: 967-975). After Zaher Shah, the states of Muhammad Davoud, Noor Muhammad Turki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, and Najibullah came into existence.

With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the war between Mujahedin and a communist state depending on the Soviet Union began and continued until 1989. After the collapse of the communist state, the Islamist Mujahedin established a state with the centrality of Tajiks and northern coalition during 1989-1996. Afghanistan witnessed the scariest, most dictator, and medieval-like state of Taliban and Al-Qaeda during 1996-2002. During this period, all of the primary signs of modern state in the political arena and primary signs of modernization in the social-scientific fields were eliminated and a full tyranny governed in this country. With the governance of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the state in Afghanistan declined to the failed states and entered a full internal war. This country turned into a secure shelter for international terrorists and a central headquarter for international terrorism (Heir & Robinson, 2007: 1). An international conference was held in Bonn, Germany during 2001-2005 with the presence of most of the Afghan tribes' leaders. The main tasks of this conference included the state-building in a new form, creating modern social-political discipline, and ending the dictator and medieval-like state of Taliban. In this conference, different tribal and ethnic- linguistic leaders including several groups participated. Such groups were the northern coalition of Tajiks and Uzbeks, Rome process which had been formed of the exiled Pashtuns led by Zaher Shah in Italy, Cyprus group including Shia leaders, Peshawar group including mainly the exiled Pashtuns in Peshawar, Pakistan (Cronin, .2002:3). This conference aimed to create a temporary state led by Loya Jirga to conduct some measures for developing the constitution, holding elections, and transferring power to the new state. Loya Jirga worked for developing the constitution like the constituent assembly. In line with this conference, the international community and at the top of it, the US put three programs of military, political, and financial on the agenda for transferring power and ending the Taliban state. Karzai's state was the output of these actions (Edwards, 2010: 979).

Karzai conducted some actions during his eight-year presidency with international military-security, financial, and administrative supports for state-building. The most important actions were creating police and army, holding presidential and parliamentary elections, creating bureaucracy and tax system, developing governmental institutions, and identifying internationally. Although these actions and achievements of Karzai's state on state-building cannot be ignored, adopting a political-historical sociological approach indicates that Afghanistan faces serious social-political challenges and barriers on the way of modern state-building and nation-building. However, these challenges prevented the success of Amanullah Khan and Zaher Shah's states on the way of state-building as described later.

4. Afghanistan, indicators of weak and failed modern state

Peace foundation ranks states every year based on 12 indicators in terms of authority, capability, or failure of states. The score 120 means the maximum failure or weakness of state and lower scores means its capability. The indicators of this foundation are presented in the table below. In the most recent ranking of this foundation in 2014, Afghanistan with the score of 106 was considered as the 7th rank of states with high failure. It should be noted that this country was regarded as the most corrupt state at the first rank of corruption in 2013.

Total score out of 120	Intervention of foreign powers	Convergence or divergence in the elite	Security institutions	Human rights and rule of law	Public services	State legitimacy	Poverty and economic recession	Inequality in economic development	Elite escape	Complaints by groups and classes	Homeless people	Population pressure	Indices score
106.5	9.9	9.4	10.0	8.3	9.0	9.5	8.3	7.5	7.8	8.7	9.3	8.8	score

Table 1. Ranking the indicators of failed state in Afghanistan in 2014 (<http://www.foundforpeace.org/>)

The above-mentioned indicators and the 7th rank indicate the high failure of state in Afghanistan. Karzai's state has faced important crises during the last decade such as authority crisis which means the inclusive non-acceptance of state by all classes, especially the areas ruled by the Taliban, influence crisis which means the weak institutionalization and inability to enforce authority and control the surrounding regions, legitimacy crisis due to the inclusive non-acceptance of state, inefficiency, and state corruption, increasing instability and insecurity due to the severe weakness and inefficiency of security-military institutions and violence by the Taliban, weakness of state in distributing goods and services in an authoritarian way, high corruption in governance, high weakness of state and bureaucracy in extracting financial and human resources, serious weakness of state and parliament in regulatory functions, as well as legislation, and its implementation.

5. The effect of diverse society, ethnic-religious divergence, and national identity crisis on failed states

The institutionalization of the hierarchical-longitudinal hierarchy between these forms of authority and the pursue of political power by sub-national ethnic- linguistic- religious identities as the supreme and most inclusive form of power and authority is considered as one of the indicators of state-building and modern state regardless of democratic or non-democratic, as well as the formation of national authority beyond the sub-national authority. National identity has been preferred to state modern in no country, but it has been posterior than the modern state. In fact, ending the ethnic-religious conflicts and solving identity crisis is the main foundation of the state-building process (Sardarnia, 2011:37).

Historical experiences indicate that the officials of the countries which already had initial national integrity and were aware of this subject faced no serious difficulty for modern nation- state building. On the contrary, the countries with no national identity but the intense superiority of sub-national ethnic, linguistic, and religious interests over national identity faced serious problems in modern nation-state building. The social-historical history of Afghanistan is a clear example of ethnic-religious divergent society, lack of national identity, lack of centralized state, and historical hatred. Such a context has worked as a serious challenge for modern state-building during the last 100 years in the states of Amanullah, Zaher Shah, and Karzai.

Pashtuns are the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the founder of this country. Since 1124 SH, 1747 BC when Pashtuns developed the Durrani Empire in Great Khorasan and called this land after their tribe "Afghan", and then changed the beautiful and historical name of Khorasan (land of sun and the east garden) to Afghanistan, they had continuously the political power and had abundant economic, social, and cultural advantages than the other tribes (Arzegani, 2012:60). Tajiks are the second big ethnic group of Afghanistan who had a big contribution to the development of culture and civilization in Khorasan, as well as the development and continuity of Dari Persian language and literature in this land. The religion of Tajiks is Islam and most of them are Hanafi Sunni. However, a considerable number of them are Twelver and Isma'ili. Tajiks are of the leading tribes of Afghanistan in terms of knowledge, education, manner, art, and participation on the media. In addition, they have abandoned tribe life more than other tribes and have joined urban and collective life (Arzegani, 2012:91-92). Hazaras, forming almost 20% of the total population of Afghanistan are the third big ethnic group in this country and are mainly Twelver and speak in Dari Persian. Politically, Hazaras were completely in political isolation and had no contribution to the structure of political power (Sajjadi, 2001:54). Uzbeks are considered as the fourth big ethnic group of Afghanistan. This group belongs to the big family of Ural-Altai languages. The religion of Uzbeks is Islam and

they are mostly Hanafi Sunni (Najafi, 2010:43). Afghanistan has many ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious minorities. Such a population dispersion has developed lots of tension and conflicts in the history of this country and has endangered the national integrity of Afghanistan. Such a context made by the efforts of modernist officials has no result in some periods of the contemporary history of this country for creating unity, national integrity, and coexistence of tribes in the framework of an efficient state in this country. In general, several diverse and divergent contexts, especially ethnic and sectarian hatred of the Taliban have made Karzai's state face authority crisis as the most significant indicator of failed state. Based on this national-ethnic composition, most of the political sciences and researchers believe that no nation has been formed yet in Afghanistan and there is no national collective spirit, national sense, patriotism, and preference of national interests over ethnic interests among the people of this country. However, the scattered and biased ethnic identities have been seriously superior in this land; the issue which can be both considered by politics and the cause of rebellions. Thus, some of these researchers have called Afghanistan "the museum of tribes". For example, Oliver, as the contemporary French Afghanologist, believes that Afghanistan has never had an integrated nation (Rova, 1991:73).

The political history of Afghanistan shows the rooted traditional political discipline based on the autonomy of ethnic-religious groupings. Thus, the efforts to create modern and official political discipline even in Karza's state have not had any favorable result. Despite some achievements and actions on nation-state building, such a discipline is still considerably far from the favorable point (Edwards, 2010: 967).

In the tradition political discipline governing the society of Afghanistan, the distribution of power has not occurred fairly and has been mainly in the monopoly of a specific ethnicity. Although Karza's state attempted to distribute power, it is still considerably far from the favorable point. In Afghanistan, any of these tribes have attempted to make a way for themselves in the political structure but their frustration in this way has led to their tendency to violence (CIA Fact book).

The 2014 presidential elections and violence after is an obvious example of civic and competitive cultural weakness, as well as the role of ethnic-linguistic belongings in the political competitions of this country. In general, the presence of different tribes and the lack of participatory culture and tribe-based governance in the contemporary history of Afghanistan led to severe and sometimes bloody conflicts in Afghanistan over years. Political conflicts and competitions in Afghanistan have mainly occurred among two main groups: northern coalition including Tajik and Hazaras and the second group including Pashtuns. Karzai had to establish a balance between these two currents. However, he would be accused by one of the two sides because of supporting the other side. Pashtuns considered him as a tool at the service of northern coalition which considered him as a Pashtun nationalist (Andisheh Institutte, 2003:50-57).

Such political conflicts in the presidential elections of Karzai in 2014 led to physical conflicts, protests, strengthened negative ethnic competitions, weak national integrity, and frustration of Karzai's state in state-building. Such an issue will be likely true in Ashraf Ghani's state. Although stress has apparently declined in the new state with the distribution of power and partnership of Abdullah in power, expecting the success of the new state in state-building is unlikely due to the rooted ethnic conflicts and severe weakness of civic culture and national identity.

6. Security crisis, high authority, and failure of state

Creating and restoring the army and police is considered as one of the indicators and processes of developing a modern state to control the country by the state and enforce the law.

In fact, the modern state is useless without force because the main mission of state is establishing discipline and security more than anything else. For this reason, this issue became one of the important priorities of the US and its allies. Afghanistan is one of the obvious examples of security and instability crisis in the world. as a result, political and academic associations have regarded this country, especially when the headquarter of Al-Qaeda is located in this country. Discipline and authority crisis due to the challenge of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda has made this state confront the severe crisis of national and international legitimacy, crisis in authoritarian institutionalization, and inefficiency in service. Authority and insecurity crisis has made Karzai's state and new state unable in strengthening the institutional bases of state, civic society, reconstruction of infrastructures, poverty reduction, and social-economic development.

Although the security institutions of Afghanistan have been reconstructed currently, they are not in a complete favorable status and require more time for achieving a favorable status. In fact, the unfavorable security conditions and weakness of security institutions are rooted in the history of the past 30 years in this country. All of the security institutions were collapsed due to the foreign military violation during 1979-1989. Consequently, different ethnic-sectarian groups having a pseudo-military nature emerged in different parts of the country. During the absence of a strong central state, this chaotic situation continued during 1996-2001. the Taliban got armed and added to the chaotic situation of this country and led to the suppressive domination of this group in the country. In addition to the internal factors, some of the foreign actors intensified this situation (Their,2009:23-24).

Following the failure of the Taliban in Afghanistan, it was assumed that the country would be led to a political stability. However, the next events indicated that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are still active in different points of this country and terrorism is expanding. The rebels used new techniques for creating insecurity and intensified the use of explosive and suicide attacks. Based on a report by Afghanistan Studies Group in the US Presidential Study Center, 20078 was the deadliest year for American and NATO forces (Report of the Afghanistan study, 2008:17). Based on the reports provided to the US Congress in 2008, the percentage of Taliban terroristic attacks increased 30% against Afghan people and 40% against American forces compared to the past years. Based on this report, 2009 was announced the deadliest year for foreign forces in Afghanistan (Morelli, 2009: 2). In this regard, based on the report of the US Congress, the terroristic actions using explosive traps increased 16% in Afghanistan in 2010 (Report on progress toward, 2010:41). The national army of Afghanistan was trained by the US and some others participating in Afghanistan war such as Canada and Italy until 2009. The number of army men reached 164000 in 2013 which had a significant increase compared to 2009 (95000). However, there is too much distance to the favorable expectation. In addition to the severe challenge by the Taliban, the reconstruction and development of the security aspect and state compulsion faced other important barriers as follows:

1. Preserving balance in using different tribes in the composition of security institutions in Afghanistan is one of the fundamental challenges in the structure of such institutions. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks contributed in this structure at 44%, 25%, 10%, and 8%, respectively.

2. Another challenge is ensuring that the foreign forces in Afghanistan are not separated by relying the ethnic tendencies and reducing the military-security responsibilities.

3. The third challenge in the structure of Afghanistan security institutions is the high rate of illiteracy among military-security forces due to the long-term internal wars in this country. As a result of these wars, two generations of Afghans were deprived of studying. Based on the 2009 statistics, only 14% of the soldiers in Afghanistan national army were literate.

Although the educational courses have begun for soldiers since 2010, it requires more time until reaching the favorable status ((Alessandro, 2011:5).

7. Talibanism and pre-modern traditional society like the important challenge of state-building

Theoretically, the gap between tradition and modernity, the rooted nature of institutions, and traditional social-intellectual currents are among the important barriers of modernizing the society and state. In this regard, the rapid and non-gradual modernization, as well as the efforts by governmental modernists to eliminate traditional currents rapidly can lead to a serious conflict between them and modern currents.

Traditional forces and currents in Afghanistan severely disagreed with the reforms by Amanullah Khan and Zaher Shah. In Karzai's state, this conflict was much more severe than before because the extremist current of Talibanas and Al-Qaeda were in conflict with the modernization of society and state. As mentioned before, this current made this state very weak and failed trough the severe intellectual-legitimate, military, and political confrontation with Karzai's state. Such a current attracted parties and influenced in the society or the illiterate, traditional, and superstitious parties having severe cultural, material, awareness, and communication poverty to make the efforts by Karzai's state fail at state-building. Such a challenge can likely make Ashraf Ghani's state fail.

Such an extremist and violent Wahhabi current turned into the most important terroristic current by gaining power in 1996. It is worth noting that a bad defense is the best type of attack for attacking an ideology. The US provided the context for the scariest and most medieval form of Islam indirectly for dealing with the expanding current and showing Islam bad to the people in the world. However, this country faced a paradox in relation to this current and now the extremist current of the ISIS. Perhaps, paradox means that the US first formed the extremist current indirectly through its regional allies in the Middle East. Then, it attempted to show a god political face with democratic excuses and fought against these extremist currents in form of international coalition.

In line with the regional origin of the Taliban, the main origin of this extremist current was the religious sects in Pakistan and religious schools of Pakistan. The Jihadi parties settled in Pakistan played a role in establishing religious schools where the Taliban studied. The traditional competition between two Sunni sects of Deobandi and Barelvi which had extended networks of schools has acted like an intensifying factor in attracting the Afghan youth at these schools (Ahmadi, 1998:27).

Since the approach of this study is related to political-historical sociology, the internal and sociologic roots of the emergence and expansion of the Taliban, being exactly the same social challenges faced by modern and failed state-building should be emphasized. It should be noted that the formation of this current should be considered in the context of ethnic gaps and cultural-communication poverty in Afghanistan. In addition, this current plays a considerable role in intensifying the ethnic, religious, and political conflicts, leading to the continuity of failed state by far.

7.1. Internal wars

Internal war between Jihadi parties began almost from the first days of the arrival of the Soviet Union military forces in Kabul in spring 1992. Some statistics announced the number of victims in this war about 40000 people and hundreds of homeless people, while the number of victims was likely more. The depth of destruction caused by these wars is understood well when we note that most of these victims never transferred to hospitals and medical centers and often buried in groups. In such conditions that people were tired of war and had a deep hatred to

Jihadi warriors, the Taliban claimed to bring peace to people. The people who were tried of war fully accepted this group because they were not incapable of fighting them again (Sajjadi, 2009:209-210).

7.2. The role of ethnicity in the growth and emergence of the Taliban

Ethnicity was effective in the form and expansion of this group. From the 185th century onward, Pashtuns had traditionally power in Afghanistan but this monopoly was over with the collapse of Najibullah's regime and Tajiks controlled the power. The Taliban considered themselves as the main inheritors of Pashtuns. During the conflicts between Talibanas and forces depending on Rabbani's state, most of the local commanders of Pashtun who advocated Rabbani's state went to the Taliban. The Pashtuns living in non-Pashtun regions such as the Pashtuns around Mazari Sharif and the north often acted as the fifth column of the Taliban and joined them as the Taliban entered these regions (Emami, 1999:90).

7.3. Lack of security

The expanded insecurity in Afghanistan during the governance of Mujahedin was so chaotic that people were looking for a shelter for social security and peace. Insecurity due to the lack of a central government and weak management of Jihadi leaders had turned Afghanistan into a horrible hell for people except the cruel pseudo-military groups.

7.4. Continuity of religious traditions and the effect of teaching at religious schools

Theoretically, no social and political behavior is formed in void, but is affected by sociability channels, social-political context, and social-political attitudes and thoughts. Thus, radicalism, conservatism, and moderation are also affected by such contexts. Thus, the progress of state-building process and social-economic development cannot be expected in the pre-modern society of Afghanistan with lots of material, attitude, and cultural poverty. Afghanistan has been always considered as a traditional society which can be even observed in Kabul. In fact, Afghanistan society is a combination of old tribal traditions and Islamic-traditional teachings that sometimes the tribal traditions were superior to religious teachings (Marsden, 2000:93).

It should be noted that the severely traditional social environment full of cultural and material poverty, as well as the lack of modern awareness made the extremist currents of Al-Qaeda immigrate to Afghanistan since the 1990s onward due to the public welcome to moderate Islamic currents to make coalition with the new current of the Taliban. The linkage of traditional groups and severe cultural poverty with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda led to the expansion of this current and severe political, military, and intellectual confrontation with Karzai's state and its failure and continue in Ashraf Ghani's state.

The Taliban movement is a biased religious movement which considers participation in armed operations for establishing their desired religious system as a religious task due to the training of their members during their years of studies so that they increase the place of this type of activity as high as Jihad for God (Ahmadi, 2011:27). The standing characteristics of the graduates of these schools are severe sectarian hatred with the Shia, leading to the more political religious hap and causing problem in state-building process and distribution of power among the Shia and Sunni (Emami, 2009:90).

7.5. Cultural poverty and social-political-awareness poverty

Afghanistan is the obvious example of cultural and awareness poverty. In this respect, the factors such as the lack of modernization in social and communication structures, stability of political system, and continuity of social-cultural system were effective. The long-term war in Afghanistan has led to the destruction of education system and severe cultural poverty. During the conflicts, the educational centers were either closed or destruction or were used as a

basis by warriors. The expansion of illiteracy among the young generation provided an appropriate context for the influence and acceptance of extremist thoughts with the centrality of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (EFA Assessment, 2001). Based on the statistics, the education index in Afghanistan is at the lowest row of indices in the world, especially the girls and rural population are completely in unfavorable conditions. Due to the devastating internal wars, it was estimated that 80% of the schools were damaged or completely destroyed. Insecurity and war made lots of students escape from the country or do some other jobs and some of them were a victim of the war.

However, some changes occurred in the college and university fields during the recent years which should not be ignored. Nevertheless, they are still considerably far from the favorable point, which acts as an important barrier to state-building and a factor for establishing a failed state.

7.6. Economic and communication poverty

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Political instability and social insecurity have led to the establishment and continuity of backwardness in this country. The Soviet Union has shaken the bases of traditional economy in this country. With the collapse of communist regime, formation of Mujahedin, and continuity of internal war, the economic bases were destroyed more than ever and provided the context for expanding poverty in Afghanistan more than ever (Pahlevan, 1998:250). Based on the statistics, near 37% of people in Afghanistan are below the poverty line and more than 30% are poor. In this regard, a large part of the population is involved in poverty. The Taliban was a current which emerged in such a society. The people who were struggling with abundant deprivation had often the complexes which had captured their hearts deeply. Pessimism to the aspects of new life came from such deprivations (Arefi, 2003:33). In addition, the weakness of communications and lack of appropriate communications channels along with the inhomogeneous texture of the society, especially in far regions being ruled by local rulers in a traditional way, caused the gap between the center and periphery in Afghanistan. Certainly, such a context prepares the groups of people for accepting extremist currents while it is still considered as one of the main barriers to state-building.

Conclusion

This study attempted to explain the challenges and barriers of state-building in Karzai's state in Afghanistan using the causal-sociological explanation from the perspective of social gaps. A quick look at Afghanistan during the last century explained this subject that social challenges were a barrier to the formation of an inclusive and national state in Afghanistan. The most important of these challenges included severe and inclusive identity crisis, modernity-tradition conflict, legitimacy crisis, dominance of traditional and tribal culture over civic culture, cultural poverty, economic poverty, and severe traditional nature of society. Critical steps were taken in Karzai's state for state-building with the support and direct intervention of the world such as formulating the constitution, holding presidential and parliamentary elections, creating security institutions, and so on. However, such successes and achievements were significantly faded versus frustrations. It seems that the new state will face frustration with the continuity of this adverse social context. In general, Karzai's state and maximum non-realization of modern state-building, as well as the failure of Karzai and Ashraf Ghani's states cannot be separated from the past history in Afghanistan. In other words, the social barriers and challenges in this country were a rooted affair, preventing the realization of modern state but causing failed states. Thus, no historical separation can be regarded. In general, Karzai's state has faced significant challenges such as identity crisis, Talibanism extremism, violence and

insecurity, cultural-economic poverty, etc. in state-building in terms of internal analysis. This frustrated process will likely continue in the new state. The unstable elections and distrust of ethnic groups in the north to the new state, as well as the events after the elections can be analyzed in this regard. It seems that the current temporary stability will not continue. The failure of the new state in terms of legitimacy, especially by the non-Pashtun groups, its probable inefficiency crisis in terms of service and security-building, as well as continuous sabotage by the Taliban are among the factors by which the continuity of state failure in the post-Karzai Afghanistan can be predicted.

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