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Political-Economic impact of growing rivalry between china and the Quad Alliance on Small states in Asia: Special Reference to Sri Lanka

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Abstract. With Asia is becoming the centre of international affairs, it has also become the battle ground for world supremacy. On one hand, China has continued to exert its power on Asia, particularly using its economic might. On the other hand, to contain this growing Chinese influence, the United States, India, Japan and Australia have joined hands and formed an informal alliance, commonly known as the Quad. This rivalry between the Quad and China is expected to make a significant impact on the future of Asia. Against this backdrop, this study examines the political-economic impact of this rivalry on small states in the region with special reference to Sri Lanka. The geostrategic location of Sri Lanka has made it a major concern for all major powers. Looking at the methodology, this study is a qualitative research and a content analysis carried out using secondary data. Here, as far as the major findings are concerned, while as individual states the Quad members do not possess enough capacity to challenge China's influence on Sri Lanka, as a single unit, they certainly a make a formidable force. From Sri Lanka's perspective, the political-economic impact is multi-dimensional. One hand, the Quad is certain to make a great impact on the foreign policy decision making process of the country. Here however, what is important to understand is the fact that this rivalry provides small countries such as Sri Lanka with greater bargaining power. Sri Lanka has the potential to be benefitted from both the Quad as well as China.

Keywords. Asian Century, China, Small States, Sri Lanka, Quad

Introduction

Today the world is at a crucial juncture as it is witnessing a global power shift from West to East with Asia gradually becoming the pivot of international affairs. Over the last few decades, Asia as a region has able to achieve great political stability and continuous economic growth. A region which for many years was under the rule of the Western powers is now challenging the West. Today, Asia possesses everything to become the hub of international affairs. Looking at the numbers, it is clear that this Asia's rise will be led by China. Today, China remains the main power in Asia and at the same time it is also set to become the most powerful country in the world. Over the past two decades the economic growth of China has been exceptional. Now for China the main concern is to consolidate its power in Asia. Looking at the recent developments, it is not difficult to understand the fact that '*the one who holds the upper hand Asia, has every chance to lead the world*'. China has already made significant and irreversible influence in Asia. However, this growing Chinese engagement in the region has

raised a major concern for some of the major powers both in the region as well as outside. To counter this growing Chinese influence the United States, India, Japan and Australia have come forward and formed an informal alliance commonly identified as 'Quad'. The Quad has been widely identified as an attempt of containing the Chinese influence in Asia. This growing rivalry between China and the Quad is set to play a vital role in the region in the coming years. Here what is important to understand is while China uses bilateralism as the main tool of engagement in the region, the Quad relies on multilateralism. Against this backdrop, this study examines the political-economic influence of this rivalry on small states with special reference to Sri Lanka. Given its geopolitical significance, and close ties with China, Sri Lanka is certain to play a major role in the Asian century.

Literature Review

The 21st Century is often referred to as the Asian and Pacific Century, indicating a shift of economic and political power from the United States (US) and Europe towards the emerging economies of Asia (Gijsbers et al., 2010). The Asian Development Bank, in its report 'Asia 2050-Realizing the Asian Century', highlights the growing significance of Asia at world stage. As the report notes;

'Asia is in the midst of a truly historic transformation. If it continues to grow on its recent trajectory, it could, by 2050 account for more than half of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), trade and investment, and enjoy widespread affluence' (ADB, 2011, p.01)

Between 2000 and 2017, Asia's share of global real GDP in Purchasing-Power-Parity terms rose from 32 to 42 per cent; its share of global consumption from 23 to 28 per cent; and its share of the world's middle classes from 23 to 40 per cent (Tonby et al., 2019). While Asia is gaining greater prominence at world stage, in parallel, China too has become a major voice within the international system. In fact, the economy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the most remarkable economic growth and transformation story of the recent decades (Chia, 2013). In fact, China's presence is now felt in every corner of the world, from the South Pacific to South and Central Asia, the wider Middle East, Latin America, and points in Between (Chhabra, 2020). China's rise from a poor developing country to a major economic power house in about four decades has been spectacular (Morrison, 2019). With Deng xioping taking over control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978, China embarked on a new journey. He was responsible for initiating reform of the planned economy to move towards a more market- oriented economy (Chow, 2018). Before its transition from a planned to a market economy China was one of the poorest countries in the world. Its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1978 was just US\$ 156 -less than one-third of the average for Sub-Saharan African Countries, which was US\$ 490 in the same year (Lin & Shen, 2018). However, since the reforms were implemented, the annual GDP growth rate averaged 9.5 per cent from 1978 to 2017 (ibid). As Shambaugh (2014) notes, China possesses many of the trappings of a global power. With the growing influence of China, the global order will orient more and more toward China as its authority grows. With China becoming wealthier and soon taking over the title of the world's largest economy, other countries will have no choice but to turn toward Beijing (Bremmer, 2013). Making a comparison between the US and Chinese foreign policy ambitions, Kaplan (2010) notes;

"China's foreign policy ambitions are as aggressive as those of the United States a century ago, but for completely different reasons. China does not take a missionary approach to world affairs, seeking to spread an ideology or a system of government. Moral progress in international affairs is an American goal, not a Chinese one; China's actions abroad are propelled by its need to secure energy, metals, and strategic minerals in order to support the

rising living standards of its immense population, which amounts to about one-fifth of the world's total”

Here, Asia will remain the most critical region for China (as well as for global growth) in upcoming years (Bremmer, 2013). As Mearsheimer (2014) notes, if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere as domination offers the best way to survive under international anarchy. While China is ascertaining its power in Asia the rise of a new alliance in the form of the ‘Quad’ also can be observed. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprised of India, Japan, the USA and Australia, a coalition with a common platform of protecting freedom of navigation and promoting democratic values in Asia (Avery et al.,2020) is also regarded as a response to China's aggressive foreign policy (Chellaney,2020). Moreover, Lee (2020) lists out five reasons which brought the four nations together. These reasons are; (1) Common interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and preventing a regional state becoming dominant, (2) Common interest in deterring the use of forceful or coercive practices to resolve political and territorial disputes in the region, (3) Sharing a deep interest in maintaining a maritime order based on the free movement of goods and services across the world's oceans, (4) Commitment to the current rules-based economic order in the Indo-Pacific, and (5) Common interest in supporting and strengthening liberal democratic governance within the Indo-Pacific.

Data presentation and Analysis

Small states in contemporary international sphere

At the outset it is important to have a clear understanding about defining and understanding small states. While there is significant amount of literature available on small states, it lacks any consensus among scholars over defining small states. As brought out by Maass (2009), no consensus definition of small state has yet emerged, despite an abundance of characterizations, rationales, and proposed definitions. Looking at the available definitions on small state, those can be explained under two main categories. While most of the scholars have focused on quantitative criteria which include the size of the landmass, population, economy and military strength, others have concentrated more on the qualitative aspect. Looking at the quantitative aspect, many scholars have used the territorial size, size of the economy and population size as major yardsticks of defining the smallness of states. According to Huntington (1991) and Moore (1995) small states represent only a tiny proportion of the world's population (Cited in Veenendaal & Corbett, 2014)

As Read (2001) notes, population size is the most commonly used indicator of country size, primarily because of the widespread availability of basic population data, easily comprehensible magnitudes and the ease with which simple threshold can be imposed.

On the other hand, Maass (2009) identifies different approaches of defining small states through qualitative criteria. According to him, the first approach is to simply define the small state in contrast to other larger states. In simplest form, small states are defined as those states that are not large states. The second approach focuses on the nature of behavior of small states in the international system. At its core is the argument that small states exhibit unique behavior in international relations, allowing them to be identified as a distinct category of states. Small states are defined by their special type of behavior. As per Robert Keohane (1969), a small state is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact. Expanding the scope of Keohane's above definition, a small state can also be defined as a state that can never act alone and make a significant impact on the international system using its quantitative or tangible elements of power (Wijesinghe, 2017). As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, being a small island nation with a territory of 65,610 sq km, and a total

population of just over 21 million it does not have the ability to influence and make a significant impact on the international system. Thus, considering Sri Lanka's situation, it necessarily falls into the category of small state.

Emerging Asian Century

Looking at world's history, for so many years, Europe had been the centre of international relations, where the continent had the sole authority over most parts of the world. However, since the end of the Second World War, the emergence of the first super power outside the continent of Europe is observed with the rise of the United States. Coming to the 21st century, once again the emergence of a new geopolitical hotspot can be observed. The Asian Development Bank, in its report 'Asia 2050-Realizing the Asian Century, highlights the growing significance of Asia at world stage. As the report notes;

'Asia is in the midst of a truly historic transformation. If it continues to grow on its recent trajectory, it could, by 2050 accounts for more than half of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), trade and investment, and enjoy widespread affluence' (ADB, 2011, p.01)

Particularly with the unprecedented economic success of China, and continuous economic growth of India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore Asia is set to challenge the status quo of global order. According to the Asian Development Bank, this growing significance of Asia is not a new phenomenon, but a reemergence, where it notes, Asia accounted for 58% of the world's economy before the industrial revolution in the middle of 18th century (ibid). As per Khanna (2019), Asia once again see themselves as the center of the world-and its future.

Table 01: Asia in 2050

Selected economic criteria	2010	2030	2050
Global output (Market exchange rates, US\$ trillions)	62	132	292
Asia share of global output	27.4%	38.9%	50.6%
Global growth (Prior decade ending in column year)		3.9%	3.6%
Asia growth		5.2%	4.4%
Asian share of global growth		59.3%	66.0%
Global GDP per capita (PPP)	10,700	19400	36,600
Asia GDP per capita (PPP)	6,600	16,500	38,600

Source: Asian Development Bank (2011)

As Table 01 indicates by 2050, Asia is set to become the center of global affairs. With Asia embracing a new status in world affairs, each and every country in Asia is to play a significant role in defining the future of international affairs. Furthermore, Asia is to become or rather it has already become the Chessboard of great power rivalry.

China's revival as a major player

Looking at the history, throughout the Cold War period, there was intensified competition for supremacy in Asia between the USA and Western Europe on one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the opposite side. With the Cold war coming to an end and the USA becoming the hegemonic power in the world, it is expected USA to play a more substantial role in Asia. However, during the post-Cold War era, with its campaign against global terrorism and authorities, USA's interests shifted to Middle East, leading to a decline in its authority in Asia. China, particularly with the introduction of market led policies introduced during Den

Xioping's era, began to fill up this vacuum. China, being the second largest economy is undoubtedly the strongest economy in Asia. China's rise from a poor developing country to a major economic power house in about four decades has been spectacular (Morrison, 2019). It was after the changes brought forth by Deng Xioping made it possible for China to achieve this power at world stage. At the onset of reforms, China was among the poorest nations on earth and a predominantly rural, agricultural country (Hofman, 2018). However, since the introduction of significant changes to country's economic structure and decision making process China has achieved great success at world stage and now it possesses many of the trappings of a global power (Shambaugh, 2014).

Table 02: Major reform steps in China, 1978–2017

Year	Reform step
1978	Deng Xiaoping's speech at the Central Party Work Conference, 'Emancipate the mind, seek the truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future'
1978	Communiqué of the third Central Committee of the CPC, eleventh National Congress of the CPC, confirming 'four modernizations' as the major goal for reforms
1979	'Open door' policy initiated; foreign trade and investment reforms begin; law on joint venture companies passed
1979	Limited official encouragement of the household responsibility system informally initiated in 1976
1979	Three specialised banks separated from the People's Bank (the central bank)
1980	First four special economic zones created
1980	'Eating from separate kitchens' reforms in intergovernmental fiscal relations
1984	Socialist commodity economy endorsed at the third plenum of the twelfth National Congress of the CPC
1984	Individual enterprises with fewer than eight employees officially allowed
1984	Tax-for-profit reforms for SOEs
1986	Provisional bankruptcy law passed for SOEs
1986	CPC approves comprehensive 'Economic System Reform Implementation Plan'
1987	Contract responsibility system introduced to SOEs
1989	Retrenchment policy; halt on reforms
1990	Stock exchanges open in Shenzhen and Shanghai
2013	Twelfth five-year plan launched, emphasising rebalancing and avoiding the middle-income trap
2015	Fourth plenum of the eighteenth National Congress of the CPC decides on rule of law with Chinese characteristics
2017	Nineteenth National Congress of the CPC defines 'new era' and China's long-term goals for socialist modernization

Source: Hofman (2018,p.57)

Given its geographical size, size of the population and economy, there is greater space for China to lead the Asian century. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by China in 2013 is a perfect example to how the intentions of China of having the upper hand in both in Asia as well as in the world. As Callahan (2016) identifies, the China's Belt and Road Initiative is a long-term project that seeks to integrate Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa into a

Sinocentric network through the construction of land and sea-based infrastructure. Jones and Hameiri (2020) perceive the BRI as a tool used by China to unlock overseas demand for Chinese industry, construction projects and loans. Through the BRI, China expects to invest in millions in infrastructure development projects particularly in Asia and Africa. While some terms this as a Chinese effort to secure global hegemony others perceive this as an opportunity for developing countries to achieve economic stability and growth. As far as Asia is concerned, almost all the countries are part of the BRI project.

Map 01: Belt and Road Initiative



Source: World Bank (2018)

As indicated in Map 01 most of the Asian countries are involved in the BRI where they receive financial assistance particular for infrastructure development projects. As most of the countries in Asia being developing countries, they often lack the required financial capacity required for infrastructure development projects. As put forth by the Asian Development Bank (2017), Asia will need to invest around USD 22.6 trillion (in 2015 prices) from 2016-2030 (USD 1.5 trillion annually) in transport, power, telecommunications, and water and sanitation without taking climate change into account.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue against the growing influence of China

To counter the growing threat of China in Indo-Pacific region, the Quad was created bringing together India, Japan, Australia and the United States. As far as Quad's beginning and evolution is concerned, its current prominence belies its humbler beginnings. It was conceived after the 2014 Tsunami relief efforts, consummated in 2007, collapsed quickly thereafter and then following a decade of advocacy, track-two for a, and scholarship, revived in 2017, as a 'natural' multilateral engagement of states with a set of purportedly converging interests in a free an open Indo-Pacific region, with China as the unnamed challenger (Byrne & Lalwani, 2019).

While this is more of an informal alliance its objective of containing the rise of China in Asia is reflected by their foreign policy objectives. For instance, the USA has always been skeptical about the rise of China and its role in Asia. According to USA, although the United

States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda (White House, 2017). It further notes that a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region (ibid).

For all the Quad members, Asia or as they put Indo-Pacific remains a matter of greater concern. As far as Japan is concerned, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, making the keynote address at the 13th IISS Summit Asian Security Summit outline the growing significance of the Asian region and identified US-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone for regional peace and security. Meanwhile, Australia in its defense Whitepaper in 2016 put forth three Strategic Defense interests of country's defense strategy. They are; a secure, resilient Australia, a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific and a stable Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, India, being another Asian country continues to make Asia an important element in its foreign policy decision making. While the main concern of Quad alliance is maritime security (Miller, 20018), it is to make a significant impact on Asia's future.

The rivalry between China and the Quad can be identified as one between bilateralism and multilateralism. While China is more concerned and prefer strengthening bilateral ties, the Quad is to follow a multilateral approach. While, individually they do not possess adequate potential and ability to counter China's rise, as a group it remains so powerful in almost all frontiers (Table 02).

Table 03: Quad members' power status analysis

Country	Rank of Global Firepower Index (2021)	Population (2019) '000	Land area km ²	GDP (Current US\$) 2019
USA	01	329,065	9,372,610	21,433,226.06
Japan	05	126,860	377,930	5,081,769.54
India	04	1,360,418	3,287,590	2,868,929.42
Australia	19	25,203	7,629,024	1,396,567.01

Source: Compiled by author based on various sources


Looking at the Quad from a geostrategic perspective, it encircles the Asian continent, making it easy for the Quad to extend its authority over the continent.

Chinese Strategies towards small countries in the region

China-Sri Lanka Relations


As noted earlier, with the dawn of the Asia, every individual state, despite its geographical size, size of the population or the size of the economy, is to make a significant impact on the international system. As far as Sri Lanka is concerned, given its strategic location in the Indian Ocean as a maritime hub, is to make a vital impact on the international system. For centuries, Sri Lanka's location and the possession of strategic harbors, has made a significant geostrategic hotspot in the Indian and a number of European colonial powers made numerous attempts to conquer the country. This geostrategic significance was the main cause for the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British to conquer the country. Possession of Sri Lanka provide the colonial powers with easy access to India as well as any part of the Indian Ocean. As far as the current situation is concerned, Sri Lanka remains a key part of the BRI project. Looking at Sri Lanka-China relations, the relations dating back over 20 centuries (Kelegama, 2020), a significant improvement in bilateral relations between the two nations is observed during the post-Civil conflict era.

Figure 01: Sri Lanka's trade relations with China (Values USD millions)



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2005-2019)


Figure 02: Sri Lanka-Import by origin



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2005-2019)

As Figure 01 and 02 indicate, a noteworthy improvement is observed in China-Sri Lanka particularly after the Civil conflict in Sri Lanka ending in 2009. Looking at these Charts, one major observation which can be made is the growing dependence of the Sri Lanka's economy on China.


Figure 03: Tourist arrivals to Sri Lanka from China (2004-2019)



Source: Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (2019)

Looking at Figure 01, 02, and 03, a significant improvement can be observed in the bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and China. Tourism sector and International trade of goods are significant parts of Sri Lanka's economy. Today China remains the largest import partner as well as the second largest source of tourist arrivals for Sri Lanka. Furthermore, over the last several years, China has made huge investments in Sri Lanka. In fact the value of cumulative Chinese infrastructure investment in Sri Lanka amounts to USD 12.1 billion between 2006 and July 2019 or equivalent to 14 per cent of Sri Lanka's 2018 GDP (Wignaraja et al., 2020), making it the largest source of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Sri Lanka.

Figure 04: Value of Chinese development finance to Sri Lanka (\$ million)



Source: Wignaraja et al.,(2020)

Some of the major projects include Hambantota port, Port City project Colombo, Southern expressway, Mattala International airport etc. (Figure 04). This growing influence is perceived by the international community in different ways. While consider this financial assistance purely as a tool of supporting and accelerating the economic growth of developing countries like Sri Lanka, other perceive as Chinese tools to expanding its authority over Asia and rest of the world. Some consider Sri Lanka has fallen into the debt trap of China.


China-Quad Rivalry and Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka has been maintaining close relations with each Quad member for centuries. The geopolitical realities and economic needs of Sri Lanka have made the Quad states highly significant in country's foreign policy decision making. For the Quad also, Sri Lanka remains a major focal point in their foreign policy approach. Taking the most recent developments, the decision of the USA to offer Sri Lanka a grant under the Millennium Challenge Cooperation (MCC) in 2016 reflects the geopolitical significance of Sri Lanka to USA. The MCC is a bilateral US foreign aid agency established by the US Congress in 2004, which provides time-limited grants focused on promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, and strengthening institutions (Collins, 2019). There are three types of MCC grants namely, Compacts, Concurrent Compacts for regional investments and Threshold programs. The MCC approved a five-year, USD 480 million compact with Sri Lanka in 2019. However, in 2020, the MCC Board

discontinued Sri Lanka compact. The decision to discontinue to grant is not the only instance where Sri Lanka’s relations with the Quad was put into question. The voting pattern of India at the United Nations Human Rights Council on Sri Lanka over the last few years is a significant yardstick to understand the position of present India-Sri Lanka relations. In March 2021, at the UNHRC, the resolution on “Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka” which Sri Lanka labelled as ‘politically motivated’ as adopted after 22 states of the 47-member council voted in favor (Srinivasan, 2021). Despite Sri Lanka’s continuous rejection of the resolution, both India and Japan didn’t vote against the resolution. Instead both abstained.


Looking at the political-economic impact of the Quad, the study identifies two perspectives. First, it can noted that while the Quad members are not strong individually in countering the growing influence in Asian countries, as a single unit they make a strong force (Figure 05 and Figure 06)

Figure 05: Total value of Sri Lanka’s exports to China and the Quad (Values in USD millions)



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

Figure 06: Value of Sri Lanka’s total trade with China and the Quad



Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka

As Figures 05 and 06 indicates, compared to China, the Quad as a single unit remains an indispensable trading partner for Sri Lanka. This provides the Quad with greater ability to influence these small states in countering the growing influence of China. If the Quad can make a trading partnership or alliance, there is greater opportunity for the Quad to balance the rising power of China in Asia.

Looking at the other side of the story, in the midst of the growing rivalry between China and the Quad, each and every state in Asia is to make a significant role in determining the future of Asia. Sri Lanka, despite being a small state will play a critical role. Traditionally, given its inability to make a significant impact at world stage or in the international decision making process, countries like Sri Lanka are known to be decision takers rather than decision makers. In other words, at all times Sri Lanka has been a bystander in international decision making process. However, this paper argues that with the rivalry between China and the Quad becoming more evident, Sri Lanka is set to become a pivotal player, rather than just a bystander. In other words, this rivalry is to change the status and traditional perspectives on small states. Sri Lanka will get the opportunity to directly influence the international affairs. The China-Quad rivalry is to make Sri Lanka a key player in Asia's century. Furthermore, given its geostrategic significance, Sri Lanka is set to receive more financial assistance from both sides. This is obviously a major political- Economic implication of the rivalry. Sri Lanka being a developing country, lacks the required financial capacity to spend on infrastructure development projects. However, this rivalry will open gates for more financial assistance in the form of loans, grants and investments flowing into the country. This will foster Sri Lanka's economic growth and ensure stability. Looking at the present context also particularly, Japan, India and USA has provided the country to significant amount of financial assistance.

Moreover, the majority of these development projects will focus on maritime economy, considering the fact that the Quad is more concerned about ensuring maritime security. Thus, Sri Lanka will become a center of maritime affairs and in this regard, maritime diplomacy will remain a matter of greater concern for Sri Lanka. The island will be offered with numerous opportunities to become a viable maritime power, despite its small size and relatively weaker economy.

Conclusion

A clear global power shift is observed in the international system with Asia is becoming the center of international affairs and given its political and economic strength, China is set to lead this global power shift. Its influence over Asia is unprecedented particularly since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. At a time when China is exerting great influence on the region, a counter punch is observed from the USA, India, Australia and Japan. This informal alliance is considered to be counter attack against China's growing influence in the region. While the four countries, taken individually do not possess the ability to match with the Chinese power, as an alliance they make a formidable force. Looking at Sri Lanka, despite it is considered as a small state, its geopolitical significance, particularly with the global power shift, remains high. Sri Lanka's unique geographical location has made it a significant player at the world stage. The growing influence of China on the island nation has been unprecedented. Today, China is making great impact on almost all spheres of the country. This growing influence has become a major concern for the Quad members, particularly to India. Sri Lanka is set to become a major battle ground for both the Quad and China in the coming years. Looking at the political-Economic impact of this rivalry on Sri Lanka, it remains multi-dimensional. On one hand, as noted earlier, while individually the Quad countries are not overwhelmingly powerful to challenge the growing influence of China, as an alliance it has the potential to

challenge the economic and political strength of China. For Sri Lanka, taking collectively the Quad remains a major economic partner and therefore has the ability to challenge the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka. On the other hand, despite being a small state, Sri Lanka can make the best out of this rivalry and use the rivalry for its benefit. When both China as well as the Quad trying to have greater foothold in the country, Sri Lanka will has greater voice and bargaining power and can be benefitted from both the parties.

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